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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
lem usually arises where the general guardian and the minor or incompetent person
are adversely interested in the outcome of the litigation. In such cases it is both proper
and essential that a guardian ad litem be appointed. Ponti v. Hoffman, 87 Wash. 137,
151 Pac. 249 (1915) (partition proceedings) ; Rupe v. Robison, 139 Wash. 592, 247
Pac. 954 (1926) (divorce).
A third group of Washington cases questions whether, after such appointment, the
party was properly represented. The trial court's answer to this question is usually
conclusive, as that court has plenary power to revoke the appointment and substitute
another if, in its judgment, the guardian ad litem is not fulfilling his duty to the party.
See State ex rel. Bernard v. Superior Court, 74 Wash. 559, 134 Pac. 172 (1913);
Crockett v. Crockett, 27 Wn. 2d 877, 181 P. 2d 180 (1947). In Koloff v. Chicago Mil-
waukee and Puget Sound Railway, 71 Wash. 543, 129 Pac. 398 (1913) it was held that
minor children under the age of fourteen were properly represented in an action for
wrongful death of their father when the widow authorized the personal representative
to bring the action. In Shannon v. Consolidated Tiger and Poorman Mining Co., 24
Wash. 119, 64 Pac. 169 (1901) the court held that a guardian ad litem need not fulfill
the qualification of a general guardian; hence it is not necessary for him to be a prop-
erty holder in the state, and need not post a bond, as required of general guardians.
Guardians ad litem are appointed for the benefit of and to protect the best interests
of minors and incompetent persons. An adjudication against a person so represented
who has had his day in court is valid and enforceable. Mood v. Mader, 162 Wash. 83,
298 Pac. 329 (1931).
The principal case rounds out the case law in this state. The former cases have
brought out when a guardian ad litem is necessary for a minor or for an insane person.
Those cases have illustrated the breadth of the trial court's discretion in the appoint-
ment and revocation of appointment, because of the court's determination of whether
the guardian ad litem, properly represents such a party in an action. The principal case
brings out the rule that a party who objects to an appointment, on grounds that he is
not incompetent, is entitled to a full hearing on that issue before the appointment can
be made operative.
It is submitted that the result of the principal case is sound and is in accordance
with the few jurisdictions that have been confronted with the same problem. In re
Haynes Will, 82 Misc. 228, 143 N.Y.S. 570 (1913); Borough of East Patterson v.
Karkus, 136 N.J. Eq. 286, 41 A. 2d 332 (1945).
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Charitable Trust-Termination by Judicial Decree. P, as administrator of settlor's
estate, brought an action to terminate a trust. Trial court dismissed the action. Held:
Reversed. The failure of the trustees to administer the trust according to the provi-
sions of the will and the failure to meet the deadline set by the court in a prior hearing
of the same case justified termination of the trust. McLaren v. Schalkenbach Home
for Boys, 141 Wash. Dec. 111, 206 P. 2d 345 (1952).
The subject matter of the appeal in the principal case originated in a prior action
brought by the administrator to terminate the trust establishing a home for orphaned
or abandoned boys between the ages of twelve and sixteen years who were trying to
make their own living. Prior to World War II, the trustees had established and oper-
ated a home meeting the requirements of the settlor's will, but with the court's per-
mission had closed the home during the war period. The trial court decided adversely
to appellant. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court in Townsend v. Schalkenbach Home for
Boys, 33 Wn. 2d 255, 205 P. 2d 345 (1949) found that there was sufficient evidence for
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the trial court's finding inter alia' that the trust was not impossible of performance or
against the public policy of the state; but remanded the cause to the superior court
with the directions to dismiss if the trust was being administered according to the
trust provisions by January 1, 1950, and, if not, to declare the trust terminated.
The rule is clear that a trust should not be terminated by mere delay in executing
it, or by a temporary inability to fulfill its purpose. This rule was expressed in Scott-
Lees Collegiate Institute v. Charles, 283 Ky. 234, 140 S.W. 2d 1060 (1940) where the
court said, ... . charitable trusts are universally favored in law, and a mere delay in
carrying out their objectives or temporary suspensions will never be allowed to defeat
them." See also Fitzgerald v. East Lawn, Cemetery, 126 Conn. 286, 10 A. 2d 683
(1940) ; BOGERT ON TRUSTS 586 (3rd Ed. 1952).
The result in the principal case would seem to conflict with the universally accepted
rule that charitable trusts are favored by courts of equity and will be liberally con-
strued in order to accomplish the intent of the donor. In re Mar's Estate, 20 Cal. App.
2d 514, 67 P. 2d 374 (1937). Under this view the court will not terminate when means
are available to operate the trust, and before termination will be ordered it must be
clearly shown that the trust cannot be performed. Scott-Lees Collegiate Institute v.
Charles, supra. Forfeiture will not be declared in a doubtful case. In re Jordan's
Estate, 310 Pa. 401, 165 A. 652 (1933).
The position reached by the court might possibly be sustained upon two theories.
The first of these is that the trust was conditional upon the continuance of the home,
and that the failure to operate by the date set by the court, in effect, established a
breach of the condition which worked a forfeiture in favor of the heirs of the settlor.
But since the law frowns upon a forfeiture, the courts will be reluctant to construe
directions as imposing conditions, unless such construction is manifestly appropriate.
Pennebaker v. Pennebaker Home for Girls, 291 Ky. 12, 163 S.W. 2d 53 (1942). It is
suggested that the trust in question" would not be subject to this construction, i.e., a
conditional trust, because, in the absence of specific words manifesting an intention to
create a condition, the instrument whereby property is conveyed upon a charitable trust
will not ordinarily be interpreted as imposing a condition. City of Newport v. Sisson,
51 R.I 481, 155 A. 576 (1931) ; Restatement, Trusts § 401 (1935).
The second possible theory for reaching the result attained in the principal case is
that the trust failed because of impossibility of performance. This theory does not
apply where the court can find a general charitable intention indicated by the terms of
the instrument creating the trust, for the courts will then normally give effect to the
general intent of the donor by modifying the terms of the trust under the cy pres doc-
trine. Quinn v. People's Trust and Savings Co., 223 Ind. 317, 60 N.E. 2d 281 (1945) ;
3 Scozr, TRuSTS § 399 (1939). But the court held in Townsend v. Schalkenbach, supra,
that the present trust did not evidence a general charitable intention so as to make the
cy pres doctrine applicable. Therefore, the question remained whether the trust failed
for impossibility of performance. The general rule is that where a trust is established
for the benefit of a particular charity or organization, and it is impossible to distin-
guish any general charitable intent, the fund or property will revert to the donor where
it becomes impossible to carry-out the purpose of the trust, even in. the absence of an
express provision for reverter. Garner v.. Home Bank & Trust Co., 171 Tenn. 652,
107 S.W. 2d 223 (1937). See 38 A.L.R. 44; BoGaRT ON TRUSTS § 150 (3rd Ed. 1952).
It seems questionable whether the principal case comes within the general rule
allowing termination where .the trust is impossible to perform unless it is conceded
that the failure to have the trust operating within the period set by the court
established that the trust was in fact impossible to perform. This does not seem
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to be an adequate test for the validity of a charitable trust, especially in view of the
liberal construction normally given to such trusts in order to sustain the settlor's
intention. Perhaps the final result of termination was necessary by the circumstances
of this particular case, but the result in future cases may bring grave injustice if
the court does not strictly limit the power to terminate announced by the principal case.
EUGENE A. GREENWAY
